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THE NOMINATION OF DR. TRICKETT.
The nomination of Dr. Trickett for Superior Court Judge, by the different political conventions, will meet the hearty commendation not only of every undergraduate
but of all the Alumni of the Dickinson
School of Law, for it places before the voters of the State the name of a man whose
ability they have learned to appreciate and
respect, from personal contact, and of
whose intimate acquaintance and knowledge of the law there can be not the least
doubt. Dr. Trickett is eminently fitted to
occupy the position for which lie has been
nominated. For many years he has been
a close and assiduous student of the law,
devoting a large portion of his time to this,
his favorite pursuit, and fitting himself,
not only to serve in the capacity of attorney and counsellor, but also for that larger
and more important sphere, namely, of being an accepted authority throughout
the State, in certain important branches of
the legal profession.
Dr. Trickett was brought up in lhe city
of Philadelphia, and received the rudiments of his education in the High School
of that city, from which he graduated in
his seventeenth year. Subsequently lie
came to Dickinson College, and after pursuing the course, received the degree of A.
B. in 1868. During the following three
years lie served in the capacity of Adjunct

Professor in this institution, and after a
sojourn of one year in Europe, was honored
by his Almi Mater, by the election to a
full professorship, which position he filled
for two years. In 1875 he was admitted to
the bar of Cumberland county and immediately commenced the practice of the law.
In 1882, he published the first two volumes
of "The Law of Liens of Pennsylvania,"
which was followed in 1888 by the publication of "The Law of Limitations" and
'The Law of Assignments for Benefit of
Creditors."
In 1890, De Pauw University conferred
on him the degree of LL. D.
Several months later, the incorporators
of the Dickinson School of Law met for the
purpose of organization, and Dr. Trickett
was unanimously elected Dean, and Professor of the Law of Real Property, with
full power to arrange the curriculum. In
October of this year, 1890, the first class
was matriculated, and during this entire
year all of the teaching was done by him.
In 1891, appeared the third volume of the
work on" Liens," which was succeeded in
1893 by the "Law of Boroughs," in 1895
by the " Law of Highways," and in 1898
by the second volume of the " Law of Boroughs." In addition to all these works,
which have secured for him such an eminent position in the legal profession, Dr.
Trickett is at present engaged in the preparation of another treatise on one of the
most important branches of the law.
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Dr. Trickett is a member of the American
Bar Association and of the Pennsylvania
Bar Association. In the latter, he is one
of the committee of seven, chosen from a
membership of over four hundred, to draft
a scheme of studies which shall serve as
the uniform requirements for admission to
the several bars in the State. In the Law
School, he regularly meets two classes
daily; in addition to this, he holds two
moot courts weekly and serves in the special lecture course.
Should Dr. Trickett be elevated to the
Superior Court Bench, and his connection
with the school severed, a loss would be
sustained which would be difficult indeed
to replace. His marked ability and success
as a teacher, his intimate acquaintance
with the. law, the benefit of which is so
constantly imparted to all those under
him, his strong personality, and the position which he has won in the affections and
respect of the student body, render the requirements of an auspicious succession of
very great magnitude. And while, with
reference to the school, upon the suedessful
termination of his candidacy, regret could
not fail to be paramount in the feelings of
all those who are interested in its welfare,
yet we cannot but express the wish, that
in the campaign greatest success shall
come to Dr. Trickett, and that in the near
future we shall learn, that the will of the
majority desires him to fill a position, for
the occupation of which he is so exceptionally well qualified.
OPENING OF THE TERM.
The conditions in the Law School this
year are of the most encouraging and
gratifying nature, and the most successful year in its history, so far as numbers
are concerned, was eiitered on the opening
day of this tern.

The incoming class is

the largest that has ever matriculated,
there being now about 60 students here, and
these, when augmented by other men,
who have been heard from, but who are
delayed in their arrival, will constitute a
class of such proportions as will be most

pleasing to all friends of the school to learn.
The opening exercises were held on
Wednesday, October 5th, at 3 P. M., in the

lecture room, which was filled to its
utmost capacity by the old and new stu-

dents. Dr. Reed, President ex-officio of the
Law School, made the opening address, in
which he referred to its past history, its
remarkable growth, and its present prominent position, as one of the best and
foremost institutions of its kind in the
country. He then spent some time in
general remarks, after which he introduced the different members of the faculty, who, in brief addresses, announced
their respective classes for the ensuing
term. Of the faculty, there were present,
Geo. E. Reed, S. T. D., LL. D., President; William Trickett, LL. D., Dean,
and Professor of the Law of Real Property.
Ion. Wilbur F. Sadler, Professor of Criminal Law, Law of Corporations and Practice; Hon. J. Al. Weakley, Professor of
Law of Pleading, H. Silas Stuart, A. M.,
Professor of Law of Partnership, and of
Decedents Estates; Geo. Edward Mills, A.
B., LL. B., Professor of the Law of
Torts, and Domestic Relations; A. G. Miller, Esq., Professor of Blackstone; Frederick C. Woodward, Professor of Law of
Bills, Quasi-Contracts, and Agency.
The attention of the Alumni, as well as
that of the undergraduates, is called to a
new feature of the FoRuiu, which, if properly estimated, cannot fail to prove a valuable benefit to all those who take advantage of the opportunities which it offers;
A Lawyer's Directory is always of value,
especially when confidence, born of personal acquaintance, and of the knowledge
of the means or institution whereby the
men whose names are contained therein,
were equipped for the practice of their
profession, can be placed in those persons
who are members of the directory. The
directory contained in the Fonumi, will
give the names of men upon whom you
can rely. It is proposed tomake itlargely
an Alumni directory. This being so,
most of you will personally know the persons whose names are contained therein,
and need have no hesitancy in intrusting
any business you may have in their respective localities to their care. In addition to this, by enrolling your name,
you will be brought constantly before the
other Alumni, and you will be better enabled to keep in touch with them. You
will help your Alma .lfater, you will help
along the FORUMu. The privilege of in-
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serting your name in the directory may
be obtained by an exceedingly small outlay, and the bread thus cast upon the
waters will no doubt return to you increased many fold. Let us have the
name of every graduate of Dickinson
School of Law in this directory.
It is with pleasure that we note the large
attendance in Dickinson College this year.
The Freshman class numbers among the
nineties,-a very marked increase over
former years. As time passes, and the
valuable results of an education in this
honored institution manifest themselves,
we trust that appreciation for her sterling
qualities will be demonstrated by an ever
increasing attendance. May her prestige
never be dimmed, and may her glory ever
shine forth anew.
A number of moot court cases have
been held over from last year, owing to
the inability to publish them during that
time. These cases, constituting the remainder of those argued during the past
year, are contained hi this issue of the
FORUM.
In another part of the FORUM, the an-

nouncement is made, that Mr. Frederick
C. Woodward, a graduate from the Law
Department of Cornell University, has
been procured as a member of the Faculty
and that he will engage, exclusively, in,
teaching. Mr. Woodward is here and
has entered upon his duties as an instrue
tor. Already he has created a most fa
vorable impression among the body of stu_
dents, by his gentlemanly bearing, his
geniality, and his intimate acquaintance
with and knowledge of the various
branches of the law, and has thus secured
the friendship of all. We heartily welcome Mr. Woodward to the school, and
wish him great and continued successes.
A number of improvements have been
made in the building during the summer,
among them being the enlargement of
the library. The room heretofore used for
this purpose was unsatisfactory, as it did
not permnit of proper arramgement of the
reports, and by reason of its snmallness of
size made it inconvenient for work. The

present library room is the large and commodious one on the second floor. The
shelves, occupying three sides of the room,
are now ample for the accommodation of
all the reports, and display at a glance,
the magnificent library which the school
has. In the room are also four large
tables, which furnish adequate space for
the use of the students.
Two new branches, the study of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, and International Law, which have been introduced
into the course this year, will prove of
immense value to those who take them.
The students should read the advertisements which appetr in the FoRum, and
patronize the merchants whose names are
contained therein, as much as possible, for
they are all reliable and progressive men,
and if they are considerate enough to extend their patronage to the Law School,
in the shape of advertisements in the college paper, it is but just that in return
the men of the school should extend a reciprocal courtesy toward these gentlemen.
Complaint has been made, that the advertisers in the FORum have not received sufficient consideration at the hands of the
students. We trust that in the future
the adage, "that one good turn deserves
another" will be remembered, and that
the men will help those who help the
FoRum.
PROF. FREDERIC C. WOODWARD.
The development of the course to one of
three years has compelled the authorities
of the Dickinson School of Law to provide
for an increase of instruction. Following
the example of some of the best Law
Schools, they have deemed it wise to procure the services of a gentleman who would
not be entangled in active practice, and
who could therefore give his whole thought
and time to the work of instruction and research. The gentleman procured, Frederic
C. Woodward, Esq., was born in Middletown, Orange County, N. Y., and graduated from the Law Department of the University of Cornell in 1894, where he won
the first thesis prize, a graduate scholarship
and a place on the prize debate.platform.
In 1895 he received the degree of LL. M.
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He delivered a course of lectures on Real
Property in the Summer School at Cornell
in 1895. For over three years, he has been
practicing law in the city of New York.
An article by him on "Statutory Limitations of Freedom of Contract between Employer and Employe," published in the
American Law Review for 1896, received
the emphatic commendation of the editor
of that important Journal. Other articles
of less interest have appeared from time to
time in the New York Law Review.
Prof. Huffeut, of Cornell, one of the most
distinguished law writers and instructors
in the United States, says of Mr. Woodward: "He is an exceptionally able student.
0 * * He is of even and genial temnpera-

ment, always liked and respected by his
associates, and would be sure to get on well
with students, for whom he would take
endless trouble. Altogether I know no
you ng man whom I could so highly recommend as Mr. Woodward."
Prof. Woodward was present at the opening of the School in October ; he will not
engage in practice, but will devote himself
exclusively to the interests of the School.
The present faculty of the School, thus
reinforced, will be able to make the three
years' course at Dickinson as thorough and
effective as that of any Law School in the
United States.

ALUMNI.
An effort was made through communication to obtain the whereabouts and
prospects of success of the members of the
class of '98. but was not entirely successful. The list which follows is therefore
incomplete. Members of the Alumni are
invited to communicate with the FoRuMt,
and furnish any information which they
might deem of interest to the school. Let
us hear from the members of the older
classes; though you are gone, yqu are not
forgotten, and the good stead, in which
the rudiments of the law that you acquired here have served you, will prove
items both of interest and encouragement
to those who arc occupying your places

in the Law School.
Geo. W. Betson, Jr., after successfully
passing the State Bar examination, in

Maryland, was offered, and has accepted,
the position of Conveyancer for the law
firm of L. M. Reynolds, 219 Courtland St.,
Baltimore, Md.

J. Thompson Caldwell, has spent his
time since graduation in travel.

Finding that he would be prevented
from taking the State Bar examination
for some time, Martin Herr has accepted
a position as stenographer for the Luminous Prism Co., of Philadelphia. Mr.
Herr will continue to occupy his present
position until some time during the latter
part of this year, when he will appear before the New Jersey State Board, for purpose of examination.

Francis Lafferty is in the office of Mr.
Swackhamer, Woodbury, N. J.
*

*

A. T. Morgan is at present in the law
offices of Boyd & E. E. Crumrine, Washington Co., Pa.
Two weeks after commencement, Mr.
Fred. B. Moser was admitted to the
Northumberland County Bar. Mr. Moser
has formed a partnership with Chas. L.
Lark, and reports, "the present condition
of afiirs very satisfactory, with future
outlook correspondingly encouraging."
G. H. Moyer has been spending the
past month in Carlisle.
*

Claude L. Roth entered the college department of Amherst, at the opening of
the fall term, where, for the purpose of
obtaining a higher education, he will pursue the full academic course.
Since graduating, Win. K. Shissler has
been making marked success along various lines, and among others, has established for himself quite a reputation in
the vicinity of his home, Miinersville, as a
public speaker. On July 3rd, he very delightfully entertained a large audience,
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which had assembled at a patriotic meeting. Later, on August 17th, he was unexpectedly thrust into the very prominent position of chairman of a large peace
celebration, held at Minersville, and the
able way in which he made himself master of the situation, and met the exigencies
of the occasion, has called forth much
favorable comment. Mr. Shissler will in
a short time be admitted to his home bar.
Austin Sullivan has spent the summer
at hishome, in Altoona. We are pleased
to note.that the trouble Mr. Sullivan experienced with his eyes has been lessened
to a great extent, and that their condition is now greatly improved.
Paul J. Schmidt may be found at Cor.
4th and Sunbury streets, Minersville, Pa.

Charles Daniels has returned to Scranton from the army, where he was acting
in the capacity of special war correspondent to the Scranton Truth.
*

*

i

Sylvester B. Sadler is practicing in Carlisle. In addition to having acquired a
very lucrative practice, Mr. Sadler is successfully filling the position of assistant
instructor in the Law School.
G. Frank Wetzel has entered upon the
practice of the profession in Carlisle.
F. Morrow was in town recently in the
interest of the Altoona Law Journal.

Oscar Clark, Denton, Md., was married
to Miss Katharine S. Duffy, of Hillsboro,
MId., on October 12th, at 8 o'clock. Congratulations.

W. H. Stamy, '97, is in town looking
after the interests of the Reynoldsville
silk mill.
Alfred Feight '97, recently entertained
his friends about town with interesting
incidents of the Porto Rico campaign, he
having been a member of the Governor's
Troop.
Blake Irvin, '97, spent the summer in
Holly. He intends locating in Honolulu.

Jos. Kissel, '94, will spend the winter
with the Blue Mountain Company (Dramatic).
J. Barton Rittew, '92, of Philadelphia,
with his wife, passed part of the summer
in Carlisle.
Wm. C. Allison, '92, of Philadelphia,
was recently in town in the interests of
the Red Cross.
Hugh Miller, '98, of the Gobin Guards,
as the result of a successful examination,
now holds the position of 2d lieutenant in
the regular army. He is stationed at
Huntsville, Ala.

Z**

Willis Markley, 96, has decided to leave
Altoona. He is undetermined at present
where he will locate.

J. Banks Kurtz, '93, has such a flourishing practice that he has seen his way
clear to invest in a beautiful residence, on
the leading residence street in the city of
Altoona. He can be found at 2.528 Broad
Avenue.

Philip E. Radle, '98, is Democratic candidate for Legislature in Northumberland
Mr. Radle is meeting with
county.
great success in his canvass, and indications show he stands a good chance for
election.
Hare, Caldwell and F. C. Miller, '98,
have returned to take a post graduate
course.
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SCHOOL NOTES.
Miss Marvel, of Atlantic City, matriculated with this year's class. The Law
School now has, for the first time in its
history, two co-eds, which shows that coeducation is not to be confined to colleges
alone, but that the fairer sex is gradually
invading all departments of advancement
and learning.
Sloan and Hartman are promising candidates for this year's foot-ball team.
Devall, captain of the foot-ball team,
who has been confined to his home by fever
contracted in the Porto Rico campaign,
has so far recovered from his illness that he
will soon be able to return to Carlisle and
again take his position on the team.
On the evening of.Monday, October 10th,
the Dickinson Society held its first meeting, when a very excellent programme was
rendered. It has always been the aim of
this society to put its best foot forward,
and by the interest manifested in its work
and the superior programme prepared, to
demonstrate to the new students the value
of a membership therein. The following
is the programme of the evening:
Debate: Resolved, That the best interests of the United States will be subserved
by the annexation of the Phillipine Islands. Affirmative, Win. A. Jordan. Negative, J. B. McEwen.
Oration-F. D. Oiler.
Recitation-M iss Julia A. Radle.
Impromptu.
The debate was decided in the Negative.
J. F. Rehm, who for the past three years
has been studying law in Alliance, Ohio,
has entered the Law School.
Walter Taylor, Dickinson '97, for the
past year teacher in the public schools of
Ocean Grove, N. J., has entered the school.
Ruby Vale, Dickinson '96, famous while
in college as a foot-ball player, and for the
pqst two years principal of a New Jersey
high school, matriculated this year. Ruby
declares he will play no more foot-ball.

On Wednesday afternoon, October 12th,
a mass meeting of the school was held in
behalf of athletics. Addresses were made
by Prof. Geo. ]E. Mills, Dr. Stauffer, coach,
and members of the school. A fair financial response was made to the eloquent appeals for money. The law school should
support college athletics, both by giving its
men and money for this purpose. The
school itself is not sufficiently large to have
a team of its own, and should supply this
deficiency by a hearty support of the college. With but few exceptions, this seems
to be the sentiment of the student body,
and without doubt this inclination will be
encouraged.
It has been requested that the attention
of the students be called to the use of books
in the library. When you take a book
from the shelves, after consulting it, replace it, instead of laying it upon a table.
By so doing, you save the time of others
when they want this same book, for they
can take it from the shelf immediately instead of being.compelled to consume five
or ten minutes searching over the piles of
books which sometimes accumulate on the
tables. At the same time you will be
forming a commendable and useful habit
and example.
Wednesday evening, October 12th, the
Allison Society held a very interesting
opening meeting. This society is the sister
and rival society of the Dickinson, and her
very excellent work makes her a formidable one to cope with. If the value of
the work done in these two societies is
fully appreciated, those who are now members of neither can improve the value of
the legal education they receive here, in
no small degree, by enrolling their names
.with one or the other of the societies. The
programme of the Allison Society consisted in the trial of a case, in which Geo. Coles,
of Dickinson Society, sat as judge, and
Weeks and McMean appeared for plaintiff,
while Bosler and Landis appeared for
defendant. Judge Coles reserved his decision. President Moyer opened the meeting with a very commendable address.
Hare, who has been refereeing the football games here, makes a model official.
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Stevens is again at his old position on the
foot-ball team, and is maintaining his reputation as a strong and valuable player.
Dickinson defeated Haverford Saturday,
October 8th, by the score of 28-0. Haverford has been coached by Woodruff, of U.
of P. fame, and that our team was able to
administer such an nverwhelming defeat
speaks well for the men, and for the trainand coaching they have undergone.
This year the three year course arrangement in the curriculum is fully developed,
there being now in the school three classes,
the senior, middle and junior, each pursuing a separate and distinct schedule of
studies. The change in the course was
made one year ago, but the separation of
the classes was not accomplished until this
fall. The Dickinson Law School now offers
to the public a three year course which is
excelled by no other, and one which, if diligently pursued by those who take it, cannot fail to furnish ample equipment for the
practice of the profession.
The following is a schedule of counsel
in the moot court cases which have been
given out up to time of going to press:
For Plaintiff.

Case No. 1.
"

No. 2.
No. 3.
No. 4.
No. 5.
No. 6.

"

No. 7.

"

No. 8.

1 No. 9.
"

No. 10.
No. 11.

For Defendant.

Aubrey.
Bosler.
Coles.
Fenton.
Landis.
Henry.
Hildreth.
Laubenstein.
Miss Radle.
Sheeline.
McEwen.
Millet,'& H.
Saulisbury.
Smith.
Stevens.
Stewart.
Wolf.
Rehm.
Hare.
Miller, F. C.
Wolf.
Caldwell.

Sellars.
Schuyler.
Freed.
Flannigan.
John.
Hartman.
Miller, J. G.
Moyer.
Long.
McCachran.
McMeans.
Prince.
Oiler.
Shambaugh.
Weeks.
Sypherd.
Seigrist.
Hoffman.
Hubler.
Jordan.
Myers.
Devall.

MOOT COURT.
CHAS. McMILLAN, ET. AL., vs. JOHN
WELSH.
Will-Rule in Shelley's case.
Ejectment.
FRANK J. LAUBENSTEIN and CHAs. E.
HORN for plaintiffs.
1. The intention ot the testator governs
in the interpretation of a will.-MacKehan v. Wilson, 53 Pa. 74; Hellerman's
Appeal, 115 Pa. 120; Wright's Appeal, 89
Pa. 67.
2. The rule in Shelley's case does notapply.-Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 10; Sheets'
Appeal, 52 Pa. 257; Affolter v. May, 115
Pa. 54; Stambaugh's Estate, l5 Pa. 586;
Giffiris' Estate, 138 Pa. 327; Salters et. al.,
Ladd et. al., 163 Pa. 59.
JOHN G. MILLER and MARLIN WOLF

for defendant.
1. By the rule in Shelley's case the
daughter of the testator took a fee simple.
Sheeley v. Neidhammer, 182 Pa. 163;
Doebler's Appeal, 64 Pa. 13; Potts v.
Kline, 174 Pa. 513.
2. The husband can hold as tenant by
curtesy.-4 Am. & Eng. Ency. 958; 2 P.
& L. 208; Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. 154.
3. Birth of a child is not necessary in
Pennsylvania to hold as tenant by curtesy.-Eby's Appeal, 84 Pa. 241.
4. Intention of testator does not always
govern.-Doebler's Appeal, supra;Sheeley
v. Neidhammer, supra; Seybert v. Hibbert, 5 Sup. Ct. 544.
Before MnUtR, P. J., and SHALTERS, J.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
William MacMillan died. His will devised to his daughter, Sarah, a tract' of
land in these words: "I devise the farm
where I am now living, to my daughter,
Sarah, for the term of her natural life, and
no longer. At her death, I give it to such
persons as shall then be her heirs; but in
no event shall my sons James and Harry
take it. Their repeated disobedience has
forfeited all right to any portion of my estate." When the testator died, he had
these sons and this daughter. They were
all married, and James and Henry had
sons. Before William MacMillan's death,
both James and Henry died, leaving the
former, Charles and Joseph, and the latter
Josiah and Harriet, to survive them.
These grand-children survived the decedent. Two years after his death, Sarah
died childless; her husband, John Welsh
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continuing to reside on the farm as tenant
by the curtesy. This ejectment is brought
by Charles, Joseph, Josiah and Harriet,
to recover the land.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

NunR. P. J.- "The intention of the
testator is to be gathered from the entire
instrument, and to effect the clear intent
on words and limitations, may be transposed, supplied or rejected when warranted by the immediate context or the general scheme of the will." Judge Hanna,
in Hallowell's Estate, 1 1 Phila. 55. Mr.
Justice Thompson in McKeehan v. Wilson, 3 P. F. S. 74, said: It is a cardinal
rule in the construction of wills that the
intention of the testator as developed by
the will must control. If it were not true
the paper would not be the will of the decedent. It sometimes happens, however,
that through ignorance or mistake of the
testator or drawer of the will, words are
omitted or inserted which have left unexpressed, or wrongfully expressed, what
clearly appears to have been the intention
of the devisor from the whole tenor of the
will, and which are necessary to carry it
out.
In the devise Df William MacMilan it
does not appear that any words necessary
to his intention have been omitted, neither
does it appear that any words have been
wrongfully expressed. The language of
the will must be interpreted according to
its proper acceptation, or with as near approach to that acceptation as the nature
of the circumstances will allow, consequently this much is clear that the daughter Sarah, was to inherit the estate for her
life and that the sons owing to their continued disobedience have forfeited all their
right in any portion of the testator's estate.
The question here is. what estate did
Sarah take under the will of her father?
It seems clear from the first part of the
provision that Sarah was to have a feesimple in the estate of her father. After
Sarah died the title was to vest in her
heirs. This is clearly the rule in Shelley's
ease. The rule is thus stated, "When an
ancestor, by any gift or conveyance, takes
an estate of freehold, and in the same
gift or conveyance, an estate is limited
either mediately or immediately to his
heirs in fee or in tail, "the words the

heirs, are words of limitation of the estate
of the ancestor."-Williams Real Prop.
404 (17th Edit.) Cf. Challis Real Prop.
123. The rule requires (1) a freehold estate in X, and (2) a remainder in the heirs
of X. Hence Sarah takes a fee-simple under tle laws of Pennsylvania.
There is. a long line of authorities which
settle the proper construction in such case
to be that when there is an estate, to one
for life, with remainder to heirs, the rule
in Shelley's case applies.-Sheely v. Neidhamer, 182 Pa. 163: Doebler's Appeal, 63
Pa. 13; Mason v. Ammon, 117 Pa. 127;
Potts v. Kline, 174 Pa. 513; Potts v. Greisemer, 174 Pa. 576; McKee v. McKinley, 33
Pa. 92; Klepper v. Laverty, 10 Pa. 40; Taylor v. Taylor, 63 Pa. 481; Kline's Appeal,

125 Pa. 480.
Therefore if the rule in Shelley's case applies, the husband, John Welsh, takes as
tenant by the curtesy. Where such intestate shall leave a husband, he shall take
the whole personal estate, and the real estate shall descend and pass as hereinafter
provided, saving to the husband his right
as tenant by the curtesy, which shall take
place although there be no issue of the marriage, in all cases where the issue, if any,
would have inherited.-Brightly's Purdon's Digest, Vol. 1, p. 806. The birth of
child is not requisite to an estate'by curtesy
in Pennsylvania.-Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa.
148; Eby's Appeal, 84 Pa. 241; Lancaster
County Bank v. Stauffer, 10 Pa. 399.
There appears however in the latter part
of the will a qualification, "but in no event
shall my sons James and Harry take it."
This however is luckily overcome by James
and Harry having issue. Were it not for
this fact it would appear that Sarah was to
have taken a life estate.
We are of the opinion then, upon the
proper construction of this will that Sarah
took an estate in fee-simple. Therefore the
husband, John Welsh, according to the
intestate laws, and the laws ofthis state, as
well as in equity, issue not being requisite,
is entitled to hold as tenant by the curtesy.
OPINION O

sUPRtME COURT.

The right of John Welsh to possess the
premises, as tenant by the curtesy, depends on the existence of an estate of fee
simple, in his wife, Sarah Welsh, nee MacMillan. The right of the plaintiff to recover
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presupposes that Sarah Welsh obtained by
the will of William MacMillan only a life
estate. The gift is to her for her life, and
no longer, and after her death to such persons as shall be her heirs. Had the language of the devise stopped here, the application of the rule in Shelley's case would
be unquestionable.
But the testator adds, "In no event shall
my sons James and Henry take it. Their
repeated disobedience has forfeited all
right to my estate." James and Henry
would, when the will was written, have
been the heirs of Sarah Welsh, had she then
died. Their exclusion would have made
some one else her heirs than would have
been such had they survived her. It is
quite clear then that not those who would
take under the intestate law are by the
testator intended to take. "Heirs" in his
will is not the equivalent of "heirs" under
the intestate law. "To bring the devise
within the Rule in Shelley's Case, the limitation in remainder must be to the heirs
in fee, or in tail as a nomen collectivum,
for the whole line of inheritable blood. * *
The rule in Shelley's case, when applied to
real property, enlarges the life estate into
an inheritance. The heirs, in such case,
therefore, take qua heirs, and it is not in
the power of the testator to prescribe a different qualification to heirs from what the
law prescribes, when they take in the character of heirs."-Kunzleman's Estate, 136
Pa. 142. In this case the devise for a daughter, Amanda, for life, and at her death for
"such persons as would be entitled to the
same by the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, if my said daughter had
survived her mother and husband, if any
she may have, and died intestate," excluded the mother and husband from the
inheritance. For that reason the rule in
Shelley's case did not apply to it.
The sons, James and Henry, died before
their father, so that, when the will went
into operation, Henry and James would
have been in fact the heirs of Sarah had
she died. But the intention of the testator
is ascertained from the language of his will
"read in the light of the circumstances
under which the will was written." The
fact that the sons are now dead "does not
bear upon the testator's intent at the execution of the will or determine its meaning
when it took effect."-136 Pa. 142.

It follows that Sarah Welsh took only a
life estate and that the remainder vested in
her nephews and niece, the plaintiffs.
Judgment reversed with venirefaciasde
novo.
WHITAKER vs. EAGLE INSURANCE COMPANY.
Contract of insurance-Conditionsprece&dent-Certificateof los--Qptiontopay or
rebuild.
Assumpsit.
B. JOHNSON MACEWEN and DROBERT P.
STEwAT for the plaintiff.
MISS JULIA A. RADLE and GEORGE
ScHuYLER for the defendant company.
Compliance with the requirements of the
policy is a condition precedent to recovery.
A proper certificate must be furnished.Kelly vs. Sun Fire Insurance Co., 141 Pa.
10; Wood on Insurance; Moyer v. Sun Fire
Insurance Co., 176 Pa. 579; Oswalt v. Fire
Insurance Co., 175 Pa. 427; Johnson v. Insurance Co., 112 Mass. 49; Mueller v. Ins.
Co., 87 Pa. 399; Commonwealth Ins. Co. v.
Sennett, 41 Pa. 161.
The defendant has exercised its option to
rebuild and no assumpsit on the policy can
be maintained.-Wood on Insurance, 253;
Flanders on Insurance, 630; Kelly v. Sun
Ins. Co., 141 Pa. 10.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

On third of March, 1896, Whitaker obtained from the Eagle Insurance Company
a policy of fire insurance for three years,
$2,000 on dwelling house and $2,000 on
barn. Policy required immediate notice
of loss to be sent to company, and as soon
after as possible a particular account of loss
with a certificate of the nearest bank president, magistrate or a justice of the peace to
the effect that he knows Whitaker and has
inquired into the fire and believes that it occurred without fraud or wrong on the part
of Whitaker. The policy also stipulated
that the company would either pay the logs
or rebuild, and would exercise its option
within thirty days after proof of loss. On
October 7, 1897, the barn was destroyed by
fire. Proof of loss was sent in, but with
out certificate.
Whitaker then applying to the nearest
cashierand president and to the nearestjustice, not being able to obtain it from them,
the company declined to receive the proof.
Whitaker applied to two other justices,
but they refued to give the certificate because it was not their business. Whitaker
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was afraid to offer them compensation because the company would object that the
certificate was void because procured by
bribe. Whitaker then notified the company
that he insisted on payment. The company
replied that it was not under obligation to
pay and that if the proof was good without
certificate it would rebuild and not pay.
After waiting four months, Whitaker sued
the company, his declaration counting on
the promise to pay the money.
Before BERNTHEIZEL, P.J., and HUTCHINSON, J.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.-BERNTHEIZEL,

P. J.
Gentlemen of the Jury:
The evidence tends to show the following
facts: Charles Whitaker obtained from the
Eagle Insurance Co. a policy of fire insurance on his barn. The policy required immediate notice of loss to be sent to the company, and as soon after as possible, a particular account of the loss, together with a
certificate under the hand of the nearest
bank president, magistrate or justice of the
peace, importing that said official is acquainted with the character and circumstances of the person insured, and believes
that he really, and by misfortune, without
any fraud or evil practice has sustained by
such fire loss to the amount therein mentioned. The policy further stipulated that
the company would either pay the loss or
rebuild, and would exercise said option
within thirty days after proof of loss.
Whitaker's barn was destroyed by fire.
He immediately notified the company of
the loss, but no certificate accompanied the
notification, he having applied to the nearest bank president, nearest justice of the
peace and to two other justices, all of whom
refused their services. Whitaker then insisted on payment. The company denied
the existence of any obligation, but added,
"If the proof is good without certificate,"
it would rebuild.
The defendant's undertaking is to rebuild or pay the loss occasioned by the
perils insured against within thirty days
after due proof thereof, in conformity to
the conditions annexed to the policy. One
of these conditions requires that a certificate shall be obtained from a disinterested
official. Whitaker has offered no evidence

to show a compliance with this condition,
and has no right of action upon the policy
unless a compliance was waived by the insurers.-Kelly v. Sun Fire Office, 141 Pa.
21.
The only evidence offered by Whitaker
to prove waiver on the part of the company is the statement that defendant
would rebuild "If the proof is good without certificate." Up to the receipt of this
statement by the plaintiff, the uncontradicted evidence of the company shows
clearly its intention to insist upon its right
to demand a compliance with the conditions annexed to the policy ; and while this
statement of the defendant is by no means
unequivocal, we are not disposed to say
that, as evidence, its weight is not of sufficient moment to warrant our submitting
to you the question whether it constituted
a waiver of the requirement in the policy.
Under the evidence of the case the fact of
waiver is a question for thejury.-Coursin
v. Ins. Co., 46 Pa. 323.
If, gentlemen, you believe that the officers of the insurance company havewaived
its privilege to insist upon a performance of
the condition in its policy, requiring the
production of a certificate from the nearest magistrate or bank president, you will
find for the plaintiff, in that the company
must exercise its option to rebuild or pay
over the sum called forin thepolicy, $2,000,
within thirty days. If you believe that
the conduct of the company does not import a waiver of the condition, you will
find for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The policy of the defendant requires after
a fire the certificate of the nearest hank
president, magistrate orjustice of the peace
to the effect that he knows Whitaker, the
plaintiff, that he has inquired into the fire
and believes that it occurred without fraud
or wrong on the part of Whitaker.
Whitaker applied for a certificate to the
nearest bank president and to the nearest
magistrate, but they refused to give him a
certificate. Two otherjustices also refused
to give any, for the alleged reason that it
was not their business to give such.
Such a requirement in a policy makes
the furnishing of the certificate a condition
precedent to the right to recover the money
from the insurance company.-Kelly v.
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Sun Fire Office, 141 Pa. 10; Columbia Ins. company. He was not beguiled into bringCo. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet. 25; 10 Pet. .507; ing the action by any intimation that the
Routledge v. Burrell, 1 H. BL. 254; Roum- want of the certificate would not be inage v. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 1 Green (N..J.) sisted on. The words did not fairly import
110; Leadbitter v. Ins. Co., 13 Me. 265.
that .the company would not insist on the
The refusal of the bank president and certificate. The jury ought not to have
magistrate does not dispense with the cer- found a waiver in them, nor ought the
tificate. The object of the requirement is learned court to have permitted it so to
to give the company the assurance that it
find.
is not imposed on by a fraudulent fire, or
But had the certificate been tendered,
by a fraudulent estimate of losses. The re- according to the policy, the liability of the
fusal oftheperson for assurance from whom
company would not have been absolute.
it stipulates to give the assurance would be The policy required the company either to
a singular reason for deciding that such
pay the loss or to rebuild, and to exercise
assurance is unnecessary. In Worsley v.
its option within thirty days after proof of
Wood, 6 T. R. 710, cited and approved in
loss. Of this option, within that time, it
Ins. Co. v. Sennett, 41 Pa. 161, and Kelly
could not be deprived by the plaintiff.v. Sun Fire Office. 141 Pa. 10, the minister
Ins. Co. v. Hocking, 115 Pa. 398. Within
and church wardens from whom the policy
that time the company informedWhitaker
required a certificate refused to give it, but
that if it was liable at all, it would rebuild.
it was held that a certificate by four repuThis, we think, was a sufficiently distinct
table householders in the vicinity was no
election. When an election is open beavailable substitute. In Johnson v. Phoe- tween alternative conditions of a contract,
nix Ins. Co., 112 Mass. 49, it was held that
the alternative chosen must be adhered to,
an unsuccessful applicationt in good faith
an election once made is irrevocable. The
to themagistrate or notary did notdispense agreement, heretofore alternate, is transwith the certificate.-Cf. Roumage v. Meformed into an absolute agreement. The
chanies' Ins. Co., 1 Green (N. J.) 110; 2
company cannot afterwards discharge its
obligation by paying the loss, should such
Biddle, Ins. 277.
If the insurance company prevented the
payment turn out to be less onerous than
procurement of the ceftificate, it would
rebuilding, Fire Association v. Rosenthal,
estop itself from alleging the want of it as
108 Pa. 474, nor can the assured insist on
an excuse for not paying. It might also anything else than the rebuilding, or comwaive the certificate as it may waive the pensation for the neglect to rebuild. It
other preliminary. Whitaker, failing to
follows, therefore, that for the failure of
get the certificate from the bank president
the defendant to rebuild within the four
or magistrate, notified the company that months following their conditional eleche insisted on payment. The company
tion, the plaintiff should have sued, for
replied that it was not under obligation to
damages, and not for the amount of the
pay and that if the proof was good withpolicy.-Morrell v. Irving Fire Ins. Co., 33
out certificate, it would rebuild and not
N. Y. 429; Wynkoop v. Niagara Fire Ins.
pay. The court below submitted to the Co., 91N. Y. 478; Fire Association v. Rosenjury to determine whether in these words
thal, 108 Pa. 474; Kelly v. Sun Fire Office,
and acts the company waived the require- 141 Pa. 10; 2 Biddle, Ins., 314.
ment of the certificate. The burden of
Judgment reversed, with venire facias
proving a waiver is on the plaintiff. -2 Bid- de novo.
dle, 416. Did the jury reasonably find a
waiver? We think not. The company
JACOB COPE vs. JOHN CRAPNEY.
denied its obligation to pay because of the
Agency-Negligence of agent-Duty of
omission to furnish the certificate, and at
obedience-Remote cause.
the same time declared that if the proof
was good without certificate, it would reTrespass.
build and not pay. Whitaker was not inJOHN G. MILLER and ELI SAULSBURY
duced by these words to abstain from efforts
for the plaintiff.
to procure the certificate. He Had tried in
The agent must obey instructions.-Huffvain, and had avowed his failure to the cut on Agency, 82; Clark on Contracts, 727;
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Shaffer v. Gordon, 141 Pa. 256; Reiside v.
Reiside, 49 Pa. 322; McFarland v. McClees,
17 W. N. C. 547. His neglect makes him
responsible for all consequent losses. Heineman v. Herod, 50 N. Y. 27; Whitney
v. Martine, 88 N. Y. 538; Blood v. Witkins.
43 Iowa, 565; Clark v. Bank, 17 Pa. 322.
Decrease of price not too remote for damages.-Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa. 194; Hemmer v. Schoenfelder, 47 Wis. 455; Lund v.
Tyngsboro, 11 Cush. 563; Pittsburgv. Grier,
22 Pa. 54.
A. FRANK JOHN and CHAS. MCMEANS
for the defendant.
Damage must be proximate result of
neglect.-Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. 171:
Jones v. Gilmore, 91 Pa. 310; Fairbanks v.
Kerr, 70 Pa. 86; McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa.
436; R. R. v. Gilliland, 56 Pa. 445; McGovern v. Lewis, 56 Pa. 231; Pa. R. R. Co. v.
Kerr, 62 Pa. 353; Keefer v. Hummeistown
Boro., 151 Pa. 304; 135 Pa. 50.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Cope owned land on which was a mortgage for $3,000. Desiring to raise money
to pay off this mortgage and some other
debts, he employed Crapney to borrow
$5,000 for him upon a new mortgage, and
to pay the mortgagee and hand to him,
Cope, the balance. Crapney found a lender,
John Smith, obtained the money from and
delivered the mortgage to Smith. He paid
the amount of the first mortgage, not to its
present holder, Horace Toomey, but to the
mortgagee, William Lark, who had however assignedit to Toomey. Of this assignment Cope had given Crapney information,
but forgetting this, he paid the money to
Lark. Some days afterwards, he remembered that Toomey was owner, and called
on Lark to pay back the money, who said
he had turned it over to Toomey. He had
not done so. Cope being unable to pay
Toomey, who was fearful that he might
lose the debt, Toomey instantly sued out a
sci. fa. and caused a sale of the premises.
The weather was bad at the sale and but
few persons attended. The farm that was
worth $10,000 was sold for $5,000 and was
bought by John Smith.
In this action of trespass Cope insists on
recovering not only the $3,000 not paid him
by Crapney out of the proceeds of the
Smith loan, but $5,000. the loss on the sale
of the farm.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

A. T. MORGAN, P. J.-The plaintiff in
this case brings action to recover damages
(1) for the amount of the Lark mortgage,

and (2) the amount of $5,000, claimed to be
the loss on the sale of his property, which
loss was brought about by the inclemency
of the weather and a consequent lack of
bidders.
(1). Looking into the case very carefully,
we are fully convinced that the plaintiff
should recover the amount of the Lark
mortgage.
It is a well established rule of law that
the agent must comply with the instructions of his principal, "but if he fails to be
directed by it and loss ensues, he becomes
liable for the deviation."-Adams v. Robinson; 65 Ala. 586; Farthingham v. Everton, 12 N. H. 339. This rule is particularly,
applicable when the directions of the agent
are explicit.-Reiside v. Reiside, 49 Pa.
322. Also, when the business of the defendant is to borrow and lend money, and
we have all reason to believe that this was
the business of the defendant in this action,
and he borrows it with the express purpose
of applying it as directed, it therefore becomes his duty to exercise much care and
prudence.
The defendant failed in his
duty, and through his negligence and carelessness the money was lost, and he should
be liable for the entire amount ($3,000) with
interest.-McFarland v. McClees, 17 W.
N. C. 547; Shaffer v. Corson, 141 Pa. 256;
A. & E. Ency. vol. 5, p. 27.
(2.) We see no ground for the plaintiff's
second claim. While we are cognizant of
the fact that there would have been no
sale of the property had it not been for
the plaintiff's negligence, yet we are confident that the loss in the sale is entirely
too remote to be imputed to the plaintiff's
negligence. A person committing the
first act of negligence is not responsible
for all its consequences. P. R. R. v. Kerr,
62 Pa. 353. The line of demarkation between the proximate and remote cause of
an event is often so indistinct that each
case must be decided on its own peculiar
merits. The cardinal rule of proximate
and remote cause seems best given in State
v. R. Co., 52 N. Y. 528: "That cause which
naturally leads to and which might have
expected to be directly instrumental in
producing the result."
"A proximate
cause may be defined as the cause which
in natural and continuous sequences, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the result complained of, and
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without which the result would not have
occurred." A. & E. Encyc. vol. 16, p. 436.
Being as generous in our views as possible
we see no connection between the results
of the sale and the plaintiff's negligence.
We are not to link together as cause and
effect, events having no probable connection in the mind, and which could not by
prudent circumspection and ordinary
thoughtfulness be foreseen as likely to
happen in consequence of the act in which
we are engaged. It may be true that the
injury would not have occurred without
the connection of our act with the event
which immediately caused the injury, but
we are not justly called to suffer unless the
other event was the effect of our act, or
was within the probable range of ordinary
circumspection when engaged in the act.
McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 442. We can detect no point in the statement of facts that
leads us to believe that the defendant was
cognizant of the intricacies into which the
plaintiff would be involved should he not
perform his duty, and though he might
have known that his negligence would
cause a sale of the property, he could not
have been expected to know the multifarious circumstances that would affect the
sale.
The loss was caused by an entirely exHe could not
traneous circumstance.
have foreseen the condition of the elements, nor could he have had any control
over them had he foreseen them. Jones v.
Gilmore, 91 Pa. 310; McGrew v. Stone, 53
Pa. 442; Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. 86.
With every desire to compensate for
loss, when the loser is not to blame, we
know it cannot always be without transcending the boundaries of reason and of
course the law.
The verdict therefore must be that the
defendant pay the plaintiff $3,000 with
interest, for loss sustained in the nonfulfillment of the contract.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Crapney undertook both to obtain a loan
of $5,000 upon Cope's land, and, from this
money to pay to its holder, the existing
mortgage of $3,000. He obtained the loan,
delivering the mortgage to Smith, the
lender, but, the three thousand dollars, he
paid to the mortgagee instedd of the
assignee. He had been told by Cope of

the assignment. He was bound to remember it. The mortgagee has failed to
pay the money over to his assignee, and
the latter has foreclosed the mortgage, and
sold the premises. It is quite clear, then,
that Crapney must reimburse to Cope the
$3,000.
The land which was worth $10,000 produced at the sheriff's sale only -$5,000.
Must Crapney make this loss good too?
We think not. Such loss is not the natural, the previsable consequence of a sherifif's sale. The bad weather was not foreseen, nor the fewness of bidders, nor the
resulting lowness of the bids. Nor was
the inability of Cope to procure the money
from some other source than the sheriff 's
sale of the premises. Loss from a forced
sale of property made necessary by the improper conduct of another, in order to
raise money is not recoverable as damages.
1 Sedgwick, Damages 187.
Judgment affirmed.
GEORGE JENKINS vs. SAMUEL
HARRIS.
Principaland agent-Authority to find a
purchaser within no specified timePrincipal'sright of control unrestricted
of auth rity.
-ev.ocation
Assumpsit.
ISAIAH SHEELINE

and

DANIEL

R.

REESE for plaintiff.
Plaintiff had no notice of the revocation
of his authority. -Capen v. Mutual Ins.
Co 2.5 N J. L. 67; Lloyd v. Matthews, 51
N. Y. 124. He procured a purchaser at
the price named by principal and is therefore entitled to compensation. -Clendenon,
v. Pancoast, 75 Pa. 213; Pratt v. Patterson's Ex's., 112 Pa. 475. The value of the
contract to -plaintiff is the amount he is
entitled to recover.-Masterson v. Master
son, 121 Pa. 605; Martin v. Silliman, 53
N. Y. 615.
W~m.

l.

FLANNIGAN and FRANK J.

LAUBENSTEIN for defendant.
When there is no stipulation in contract
as to time of employment the principal
has a right to terminate it at any time
without notice to agent. -Blackstone v.
Buttermore, 53 Pa. 266; Coffin v. Landis,
5 Phila. 176; Hill v. Jones, 152 Pa. 435;
Park v. Frank, 75 Cal. 364. Any disposition of the subject matter will amount to
a revocation.-Walker v. Dennison, 86
Ill. 142; Simonton v. First Nat. Bank, 24
Miss. 216.
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Before SoRHn T, P. J., and SNYDER, J.

But let us look thoroughly into the circumstances of the case. The agreement
On February 18, 1891, Harris gave to was made on February 18, 1891,-plaintiff
procures purchaser in 1895,-defendant in
Jenkins the following paper:
the meantime conveys the farm himself
NEW YORK, Feb. 11, 1891.
in December 1894.
"Whereas I desire to sell my land in
Had it been shown that defendant conHarris County, Iowa, I hereby agree that
veyed to a purchaser who was procured
if George Jenkins shall find me a pur- through the agency or instrumentality
chaser, I will convey to him or the person
and labor or expense of the plaintiff, and
thus fftind by him, the said farm for the the agreement been with express or imsum of $19,000, but until such sale shall be
plied commission, according to the weight
made, I shall have the right to control the of authorities, plaintiff
would have refarm precisely as if this agreement had
covered. Sussdorf v. Schmidt, et. al., 55
not been made, except that I shall do N. Y. 319; Martin v. Sillman, 53 N. Y.
nothing to diminish the value of the farm. 615; Masterson v. Masterson, .121 Pa. 605;
SAMUEL HARRIS."
Moses v. Beirding, 31 N. Y. 462.
In 1895, Jenkins found a purchaser, who
But here the defendant procured the
had offered to him $30,000 for the farm,
purchaser himself without the agency or
and demanded that Harris should convey
instrumentality of the plaintiff.
And
it to him. Harris refused, because he had
therefore defendant is not liable for any
already sold the farm in December, 1894,
commission. McClare v. Pain% 49 N. Y.
for $32,000.
561.
This action is brought to recover $11,000
The undertaking of the plaintiff was to
damages for the refusal to convey.
make efforts to procure a purchaser, but
if he failed, he is entitled to no commisOPINION OF THE COURT.
sion, unless there had been a special conSCHMIDT, P. J.
If this were an agreement with a con- tract. And under the condition the desideration express or implied and the plain- fendant had a right to negotiate the sale
himself. Sussdorf v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y.
tiff complied with its terms, according to
the weight of authorities, it is obvious that 319.
As the power of constituting an agent is
the defendant would have been obliged to
give the plaintiff notice of the termination
founded upon the right of the principal to
or revocation of the agency. And in de- do the business himself, it follows that
fault of such notice, plaintiff could have when that right ceases, the right of creatrecovered damages. Clendenon v. Pan- ing an appointment or agency already
made must also cease.
coast, 75 Pa. 213; Pratt v. Patterson, 112
So, where the principal has parted with
Pa. 475; Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42. But
in this case we are presented with a dif- his right in the subject matter of the
ferent state of circumstances.
Harris
agency before the attorney or agent in
fact had exercised the power, it will be a
gives Jenkins a naked agreement without
a consideration, without promise to pay revocation in law of the power conferred.
commission of any kind, and reserves the Gilbert, et. al., v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 548;
right to control the farm precisely as if the Sussdorf v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319.
agreement had not been made. An agreeUnder the circumstances of the case the
ment without consideration or commission
plaintiff cannot recover.
to be paid, is no agreement at all. The reaOPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
son is plain without further explanation.
The writing of February 11, 1891, 'may
And taking the clause into consideration, defendant resekved the right to con- be considered as a contract of agency to
trol the said farm precisely as if the agree- sell, or as a contract of sale. From the
first point of view, it constitutes Jenkins'
ment had not been made.
agent to find a purchaser of the farm for
Under that clause defendant reserved
to control the farm as he saw fit and sell the sum of $19,000. Jenkins does not reit to whom he pleased and at any time ceive the power, himself, to make the conveyance, but Harris agrees to make the
he thought proper.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
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conveyance when the purchaser has been
found by Jeinkins.
A principal may authorize an agent to
sell land or chattels at a certain price, and
may agree that whatever the latter is able
to obtain in excess of that price shall be
his compensation for his services as agent.
Everhart v. Searle, 71 Pa. 2 6. Whensuch
an arrangement is made, if the sale were
effected, the agent would be entitled to
the excess. Kramer v. Winslow, 154 Pa.
637.
But, the naming of a price at which the
agent may sell, is nob an implied agreement to give him whatever he may obtain beyond that price. On the contrary,
if he sells for more than the designated
sum, he must account to the principal for
what he actually gets. Kramer v. Winslow, 130 Pa. 484; 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
(2 ed.) 1072; Cutter v. Demmon, IIl Mass.
174. If then Harris had conveyed to the
vendee discovered by Jenkins, for $19,000,
and the vendee had paid to Jenkins
$11,000, Jenkins would have been compelled to pay this sum over to Harris.
Had a conveyance been made by Harris
to a purchaser discovered by Jenkins, the
former would have been liable to the latter
for the commissions stipulated for. Asthe
agency was revoked by Harris, he was
bound to compensate him for his time,
trouble and expenditures, on a quantum
meruit. Jackel v. Caldwell, 156 Pa. 266;
Hill v. Jones, 152 Pa. 433. But Jenkins
has not declared upon compensation due,
but upon an alleged contract that he
should have the difference between $19,000
and whatever sum he could sell the land
for. The two objections to a recovery on
this statement are (1) that no such agreement is proven; and (2) that the sale was
not in fact brought to pass by Jenkins.
It is difficult to put on the agreement of
Harris any other interpretation than that
which makes it one of agency. Jenkins
seems thus to have considered it. Four
years after it was made he found a purchaser, and then required Harris to convey
the land to this purchaser. In the phrase
"I hereby agree that if George Jenkins
shall find me a purchaser, I will convey
to -him, or to the person thus found by
him, the said farm"; the words "to him"
seem to contemplate a conveyance to Jenkins only as a step towards lodging the

estate in the purchaser. The agreement if
considered as one to sell gave Jenkins an
option without consideration. The option
was not exercised for four years. This
was an unreasonably long time. A gratuitous offer must be accepted within a
reasonable time. But, if Jenkins had a
right still to insist on the conveyance, he
had such right only on the conditibn that
he was ready to pay the money at the
time he demanded the deed. It does not
appear that he was thus ready. Kellow
v. Jory, 141 Pa. 144.
We see no error in the conclusion of the
learned court below, and the judgment is
affirmed.
ADAM CLEMENTS vs. JOHN LOGAN
Interest on a mortgage-Failure of life
tenant to pay-Foreclosure sale-Purchase by life tenant-Ejectment by remainder-man.
Ejectment.
MARLIN WOLF for the plaintiff.
1. While a life tenant may purchase the
premises at a sale on a mortgage, though
the same may be foreclosed by reason of
his default in payment of interest, yet if
hefraudulently desists from the paymentof
interest, he cannot lawfully acquire the
property and thus defeat the interest of
the remainder-man.-Fidelity Insurance
Co. v. Dietz, 132 Pa. 36.
2. It is the duty of the life-tenant to pay
the accruing interest.-4 Kent's Commentaries, 76; Tiedman on Real Property, 48,
49; Plymton v. the Boston Dispensary.
3. There can be no action but ejectment.-Evans v. Pike, 118 U. S. 241.
4. Logan is not an innocent nerson.
B. JOHNSTON MACEwEN and LLEWELLYN HILDRETH for-the defendant.
1. The action of ejectment is founded on
a present right of possession and cannot
be used to retore the possession to one if
he have no present title thereto.-Heffner
v. Betz, 32 Pa. 376; Prutzman v. Ferree, 10
Watts 143; Lykens v. Whelan, 15 Pa. 483;
Fisher v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 392.
2. Conveyance of a greater estate will
have the mere effect of conveying what
interest he had and no forfeiture results.-i
Washburn on Real Property, 119; Tiedman
on Real Property, 47; 2 Washburn, 589;
Litchfield v. Ferguson, 141 Mass. 99.
Before STROUSS, P. J.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
STROUSS, P. J.-Harper Snyder owning
land in fee, executed on it a mortgage for
$5,000 to Charles Hunt.
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The interest on the mortgage was payable semi-annually. He subsequently died,
devising the land to his son Henry for
life with remainder to Henry's daughter
Rebecca. During Henry's life his daughter sold the remainder to Adam Clements.
The interest for five years on the mortgage remained unpaid when on October
3, 1895, a scire facias was sued out on
which later a judgment was recovered.
On the judgment a sheriff's sale took place
and Henry Snyder became the purchaser.
He had refused to pay the interest, thinking that in that way he would induce
Hunt to foreclose the mortgage and intending if a sale took place to become the
owner of the farm- Hunt would not have
foreclosed the mortgage had the interest
been promptly paid. Clements was apprised of the neglect to pay the interest
but was not made a party to the sci. fa.
After Henry Snyder became the purchaser
at the Sheriff's sale, he conveyed the farm
to John J. Logan who had knowledge of
facts.
A life-estate was devised by Harper
Snyder to his son Henry, and the remainder to Henry's daughter. The entire estate having been encumbered by Harper
Snyder, both the life-estate and remainder
are subject to it.
The remainder, which is k vested one,
was conveyed by Henry's daughter to
one Adam Clements, who took the estate cum onere.
Both estates being subject to the encumbrance, it becomes necessary to sscertain
the relative duties of the life-tenant and
remainder-man in respect thereto. It is a
well established principle of the law that
it is the duty of the life-tenant to pay all the
accruing interest on the existing encumbrances. He cannot, however, be called
upon to pay the principal of the debt. The
payment of the principal rests upon the
remainder-man,-and if, by reason of the
default of the life-tenant, the remainderman, in order to prevent foreclosure, pays
the entire debt, he can recover from the
life-tenant the interest which he would
have probably paid during his life tenancy. If, on the other hand, the lifetenant pays the entire mortgage debt he
becomes the creditor of the remainder-man
for the share of the latter.

From the evidence in the case we are
convinced that the life tenant, by refusing
to pay the accrued interest, when he had
sufficient funds to enable him to purchase
the entire estate at the sale, took an unfair advantage of the remainder-man who
may have been unable to prevent the
alienation of the estate because of his financial inability at that particular time.
The fact that he intended thus fraudulently to defeat the remainder is clear.
He, therefore, could not acquire such an
interest under the sale as will defeat the
estate of the remainder-man. The estate
which he acquired as the sheriff's vendee
is determined in Fidelity Ins. Co. v.
Diety, 132 Pa. 36, which states that while
a life tenant may purchase the estate at
such a sale, though the mortgage be foreclosed by reason of his default in the payment of interest, yet if he fraudulently
dosists from the payment of interest he
cannot acquire such an interest as will defeat the estate of the remainder-man. Nor
is Henry Harper's vendee, John J. Logan,
in any better position than his vendor, he
having purchased the estate with knowledge of all these facts.
It is a well settled principle of the law
that everyone having a right to the redemption of the mortgaged premises must,
in order to destroy his equity, be made a
party to the foreclosure proceedings. Was
the interest of Adam Clements in the
mortgaged premises such an interest as to
compel his being made a party to the suit,
he having a vested remaindei? We answer the question in the affirmative. His
right to redeem, therefore, still exists, unaffected by the sale. The effect of a defective foreclosure is clearly set forth in
Evans v. Pike, 118 U. S. 241, which states
that if the foreclosure is defective because
one who had a right to redeem had not
been made a party, the only remedy for
such a person is an action for redemption.
He cannot maintain an action for possession before redemption or an offer of redemption. Inasmuch as there is no evidence of the fulfillment of this condition
precedent by Adam Clements his action
in ejectment does not lie.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

Henry Snyder had a life estate in the
land for which the ejectment is brought,
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and Adam Clements the remainder in fee.
Upon both interests rested the mortgage
which the former owner, Harper Snyder,
had imposed. There are certain relations
of owners of land which make a purchase
of an encumbrance on it, or of an outstanding title to it by one of them inure to the
benefit of the others. One of these relations
is a tenancy in common. If oie of the cotenants buys a competing title, he must
admit his fellow-tenants to a share in it.
Weaver v. Wible, 9-,5Pa. 270; Lloyd v.
Lynch, 28 Pa. 419; Gibson v. Winslow, 46
Pa. 380; Powell v. Lantzz, 173 Pa. 543;
Aultman's Appeal, 98 Pa. 505; Dickey's
Appeal, 73 Pa. 218. Another of these relations is that between particular tenant and
remainder-man. The purchase of an encumbrance on both interests by the former
will not give him the exclusive benefit of
it, if the remainder-man is willing to contribute.-Whitney v. Salter, 36 Minn. 103
(cited 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. 882). Perhaps
neighborhood of the lands held by two does
not produce a right in one owner to share
the benefit of a purchase on a common encumbrance made by the other. Thus,
where A. owned the surface and B. the
mines below, a purchase by B. of the whole
on a sale for taxes assessed on the whole
before its division into two interests, was
held not to inure to the benefit of A.Powell v. Lantzz, 173 Pa. 543. The lands
held by A. and B. were as physically different as if, instead of being divided from
each other horizontally, they had been divided perpendicularly.
The particular
tenant and the remainder-man own precisely the same land. So also do the tenants in common. The former have successive enjoyments, the latter simultaneous. We cannot accept such dicta of the
lower court, in Fidelity, etc., Dlep. Co. v.
Dietz, 132 Pa. 6, as indicate that the lifetenant may buy an encumbrance, or the
land at a sale of it on an encumbrance for
his own peculiar benefit. The judgment
reached in that case could be vindicated,
without holding such a doctrine, for the
reason (a) that the plaintiff, claiming under the life-tenant who bought the land at
the mortgage sale was a purchaser without
"notice of any irregularity or fraud on the
part of the life-tenant or any one else,"
and (b) that the remainder-man had re-

ceived a portion of the money paid by the
life-tenant, p. 39.
But, as respects Clements, the remainderman, it was Henry Snyder's duty to pay
the semi-annual interest on the mortgage.
1 Washb. Real Prop. 123; Tiedeman, Real
Prop. 48; 4 Kent 76. Not only did he not
do this, but he omitted to do it in order to
induce the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage, and in order that he might become
the purchaser. The mortgagee would not
have sold the premises had the interest
been paid. If a life-tenant causes a sale
for taxe.- assessed during his estate, which
he is bound to pay, Pike v. Wassell, 24 U.
S.714, he will buy for the benefit of the
remainderman as well as of himself.-Prettyman v. Walston, 34 Ill. 175; 6 Am. and
Eng. Ency. 882. "To neglect to pay the
taxes for the purpose of causing a sale of
the estate, to enable him to destroy the
rights of the reversioners, would have been
a fraud upon their rights.'"-Varney v. Stevens, 22 Mle. 331. Had the mortgage sale
not been due to the neglect of Henry Snyder to pay the interest, he must have allowed the remainder-man to redeem the
remainder by paying the proper proportion
of the purchase money, afortiorimust he
do so, when the sale was deliberately procured by his refusal to pay the interest
which, as respects the remainder-man, he
was bound to pay.
With this conclusio i the learned court
below agrees. It refuses, however, to permit a recovery in the ejectment until the
redemption of the land; that is, as we suppose, until the ascertainment by some judicial proceeding of the sum'which Clements
should pay to Snyder, and until the payment or tender to Snyder or his representative of the amount thus found to be due.
After Henry Snyder bought the land at
the mortgage sale he sold itto John Logan,
the defendant, who had knowledge of all
the facts, and Logan, after the expiration
of the life estate, is now in possession.
Ejectment is in Pennsylvania an appropriate action for enforcing an equity in land,
affecting because of circumstances the title
of a purchaser at a judicial or other sale.
Thus, if an administrator buys land at his
own sale, the heir may recover it, in ejectment.-Chronister v. Bushey, 7 W. & S.
152; Cf. Powell v. Lantzz, 173 Pa. 543.
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Had Snyder bought the mortgage, he could
The blockading of the street was a nuishave taken possession of the premises as ance of a public character. The plaintiff,
assignee of the mortgagee. His represent- by showing speial damage, has a right of
action. Bigelowon Torts, 287; Pollock on
atives could have retained the possession
Torts, 2.55; Hauck v. Pipe L. Co., 153 Pa.
after his death, as could Logan, his as- 366; Stockton's Case, -19 Pick. 147; Runyon v. Bodine, 14 N. J. L. 472.
signee. It is well settled that the mortgagor
By reason of the change in the grade of
may institute an ejectment for the recovery
the street the plaintiff shouldreceive comof the land from the mortgagee in posses- pensation. It was an injury to his propsion, 1 Liens, 177; 3 Liens, 181, and a pre- erty, regardless of the fact that he did not
vious tender of the residue of the debt is own the stieet. * "Any house, standing
unnecessary. Ibid. The jury will find or erected on, any highway" * are the
words of the Act. Section 8 N. J. Stathow much remains due, and will condition
utes 2820; "Township" construed same
the habere facias upon the amount thus act, 2822; Cline v. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 98.
In any event, it is not for the defendfound due. This method is entirely approants to interpose plaintiff's non-ownership
priate here. Snyder has not directly bought
of fee in street. "Any possession is legal
the mortgage, but he has bought the land
possession against a wrongdoer." Bigeunder it under circumstances that author- low on Torts.
ize him or his assignee to hold it, after the
WEEKS, attorney for defendants.
expiration of his life estate, only until he
An easement cannot be created by parol.
is repaid what he paid in order to extin- Brown on Statute of Frauds, Sec. 232;
guish the mortgage. Clements well brings Gale and Whatley's Law of Easements, p.
the ejeetment, and the verdict of the jury 12; Banghert v. Flomerfelt, 43 N. J. L. 28.
A permanent right to hold another's
must ascertain what he must pay to Logan,
land and use at all times without his conas the assignee of Snyder, as his proper sent cannot be created by parol. Cook v.
share of the mortgage debt.
Stearns, 11 Mass. 533; Mumford v. WhitJudgment reversed, with venire facias ney, 15 Wendall (N. Y.) 382.
No action shall be brought upon any
de novo.
contract for the sale of lands, or any interest in or concerning them unless the agreement be in writing, 9 Section Statute of
EDWARD G. MILLER vs. THE INFrauds.
HABITANTS OF GREENWICH
FREED and AUBREY for plaintiff.
TOWNSHIP AND JOHN RAMBO,
The ownership of the fee in the highway
NEW JERSEY.
is not necessary to maintain an action for
damage caused by alterations in the street.
Frost v. Earnest, 4 Wharton 86; Turnpike
GEO. W. AUB3EY for plaintiff.
Co. v. Brosi, 22 Pa. 29; Brown v. Powell,
A parol license, after expenditure of
25 Pa. 229; North Pa. R. R. v. Davis, 26
money by licensee under power of the Pa. 23.8; Parks v. The City of Boston, 15
license, becomes irrevocable. Swartz v. Pick. 198; Paterson v. The City of Boston,
Swartz, 4 Pa. 353; Freeman v. Headley, 3 20 Pick. 159.
Vr. (N. J.) 225; Elmer v. Stichter, 19 Pa.
The fee in the highway is only impor19; Freeman v. Headley, 4 Vr. (N. J.) 524.
tant in so far as it reserves to the owner
Lacy v. Annett, 33 Pa. 169; Silsby v. Trot- the latent fee. 3 Kent Com. 434.
ter, 3 Stewt. (N. J.) 228.
According to Pennsylvania statute all
A parol license, when executed, may be- that is necessary to maintain a suit for
come an easement.-Dark v. Johnson, 55
damages is that the suitor be an abutting
Pa. 164; DeHare v. U. S., 5 Wall. 599;
owner, which, Miller was. I Pepper and
Foster v. Browning, 4 R. I. 47; Veghte v.
Lewis, 4182.
R. W. P. Co, 19 N. J. Eq. 143; Hazleton
The agreement between Miller and Paul
v. Putnam, 3 Pinn. (Wis.) 107.
for the building of a drain was such a liSuch license is a species of property. cense as our law permits and which need
Anderson's Dictionary.
not be evidenced by a writing. McKellip
For damage to his drain, defendants are v. McIlhenny, 4 Watts 317; Rerick v.
liable.-Pollock on Torts, 237 et. seq.; Kern, 14 S. and R. 267; Lacy v. Arnett et
Ringer v. Bodine, 2 Green N. J. 72; Elmer at.. 33 Pa. 172.
v. Stichter, supra; Morris & Co. v. Jersey
The license being executed, and a valuCity, 26 N. J. Eq. 294; Rerick v. Kern, 14 able consideration having been paid thereS. and R. 267; Lippincott v. Smith, 1 fore, it assumes and is for all practical
South N. J. 99; La Fevre v. LaFevre, 4S. purposes an easement. Dark v. Johnston,
and R. 241; Dale Mfg. Co. v. Grant 5 Vr. 55 Pa. 170; Thompson v. McElatney, 82
N. J. 138; Merrit v. Packer, 1 Coxe N. J.
Pa. 175; Campbell v. McCoy et. al., 31 Pa.
460; Furgeson v. State, 2 Vr. (N. J.) 84.
263.
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J. P. WOOD for defendant.

The court was right in non-suiting
plaintiff, for it is a well settled principle of
law thata good easement cannot becreated
by parol. Banghert v. Flomerfelt, 43 N.
J. L. 28; 3 Kent's Commentaries, 452;
Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31;
Cronkhite v. Cronkhite, 94 N. Y. 327:
Morse v. Copeland, 2 Gray 302; Cook v.
Sterns, 11 Mass. 537; Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend. 382.
STATEMENT OF CASE.

Plaintiff was the owner of a lot on the
corner of Main street and Commerce street
in an unincorporated village in New Jersey
.on which lot were erected a dwelling house
and barn, The lot was about sixty-five
feet wide on Main street, and two hundred
and fifty feet in length on Commerce
street, being a rectangle in shape. Cominerce street runs north and south and the
ea:st line of plaintift's lot is the west line of
said street; inotherwords, plaintiffdoes not
own the fee in the soil under the street
which belongs to one Paul, the abutting
owner on the opposite side of said Commerce street. The plaintiff's entrance to
his lot is from Commerce street and his
premises were drained by means of a sewer
or drain laid from his house across Commerce street through land of said Paul to
creek about a quarter of a mile distant,
under a verbal agreement with said Paul,
that in consideration of said easement,
Paul should be permitted to tap said sewer
and drain his premises which lay between
plaintiff's house and the creek.
The Township Committee of the said
Township of Greenwich passed a resolution to alter the grade of said Commerce
street in conformity to a grade established
by a civil engineer employed for that purpose, and under that resolution the defendant Rambo, who was a member of the
Township Committee, excavated the
earth in Commerce street in front of
plaintiff's lot, to a depth of three feet.
While the alterations in the grade were
being made, the plaintiff sued out of the
Supreme Court a writ of Certiorari to remove the said resolution under which the
township authorities were acting into the
said court for review, and such proceedings
were thereupon had that the said resolution was set aside and for nothing holden.
The plaintiff then brought this suit which
is an action of trespass to recover damages

for alleged injuries resulting from such
change of grade in the street. The amount
of-damage as proved at the trial were:
First: Obstruction of access to hislotby
blocking off Commerce street at either
end of the lot, for several weeks leaving
only the footpaths open.
Second: The altered appearance of
plaintiff's house by placing the grade of
the street out of harmony with the grade
of lot.
Third: The destruction of plaintiff's
drain.
The trial court sustained a motion to
non-suit plaintiff on the grounds that an
action at law would not lie for the damages sustained because the plaintiff did
not own the fee in the street and that his
easement rested in parol; citing Banghert
v. Flomerfelt, 43 N. J. Law, p. 28.
OPINION.

In this case the plaintiff was non-suited
in the court below, the court relying on
the doctrine as laid down in Banghert v.
Flomerfelt, 43 N. J. L. 28, in that an easement could not be created by parol. And
on the ground that the plaintiff did not
own the fee in the street. The defendant's
main point appears to be, in the fact that
the easement rests in parol, and that it
cannot be created by parol, to be valid.
It is well settled in the state of Pennsylvania and in the state of New Jersey that
an easement cannot be created by parol,
and it is not necessary to cite authority.
Conceding that it is not an easement, it is
then a license, and after the plaintiff;
Miller, had expended a large amount of
money in constructing this drainage system and permitting Paul to tap the drainage system, we are of the opinion that it
ripened into an irrevocable license. Elmer
v. Strichter, 19 Pa. 19. And further if it
was an executed license it may become an
easement, when the licensee has done acts
in reliance of the said license and the
licensor will be estopped from revoking it
to.the injury of the said licensee. Dark et.
al. v. Johnston, et. al., 55 Pa. 164. Now if
the license in this case has become irrevocable by the acts of Miller making ha- provements on this land, by creating a
drainage system, and permitting Paul to
tap it, Paul himself would be estopped
from attacking it on the authority of the
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above cited case. And if Paul is estopped
it is not clear to this court how third
parties could attack this easement or license collaterally. And we are of the
opinion that it cannot be attacked in such
a manner. Further, Miller certainly had a
right in the property of Paul, and if this
right was destroyed by the act of third
parties, we certainly think he is entitled to
damages for the infringement of said right,
and it is only just and equitable that he
should be allowed damages for the destruction of his drainage system.
The learned court below also erred in
holding that as the defendant did not
own the fee in the street he could not recover, thereby forgetting, or overlooking
the fact, that the plaintiff was an abutting
owner on said street. If plaintiff was
damaged by the grading of said street he
has a right to recover on this point also.
And the appearance of his house being
altered by placing theagrade of the street
out of harmony with the grade of the lot,
he surely must have suffered damage as it
is quite evident that his adjoining property
has depreciated in value. And thestatutes
of New Jersey gives him his right of action,
Section 8, N. J. tatutes 2820.
The resolution which gave defendants
the right to excavate this street, being
declared of no effect by the Supreme Court
of N. J. We are of the opinion that it
was void ab initio, and practically amounted to a nuisance, and if the plaintiff can
prove special damage he has a right of
action for the obstruction of access to his
lot. Hauck v. Pipe L. Co., 153 Pa. 366;
Runyon v. Bodine, 14 N. J. L. 472. Had
this resolution been declred valid, we
think the plaintiff could not have recovered for the obstruction of access to his
lot, as all public improvements are attended with more or less inconvenience to
the residents where the improvements are
being made.
Under these views of the case, we are of
the opinion that the learned court below
erred in granting the non-suit, and the
judgment of said court is reversed and set
aside and a new trial is ordered.

AMOS HELLMAN'S ASSIGNED
ESTATE.
Exceptions to Distribution.
GEORGE W. COLES and GEORGE L.
SCHUYLER for the acceptant.
The creditors take pro rata out of the
personal estate accordingto their respective
debts.-Kittera's Estate, 5 Hams 416;
Shunk's and Freedley's Appeal, 2 Pa. 309;
Morris v. Olvine, 10 Harris 441; Miller's
Appeal, 1 Casey 481: Miller's Estate, 82
Pa. 113; Graeff's Appeal, 79 Pa. 146.
The judgment of Curry is not a lien on
personal property.-Trickett on Liens, vol.
1, p. 221; Fryhoffer v. Busby, 17 S. & R.
121. He is entitled to apro ratashare on
his whole claim out of the assigned personal estate irrespective of his holding collateral security.-Miller's Estate, 82 Pa.
113; Patten's Appeal, 9 Wright 151; Long's
Appeal, 23 Pa. 297; Millers Appeal, 35 Pa.
481.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

From the facts in this case it appears that
on the third of January, 1890, Hellman assigned his estate to Josiah Curry in trust
for the benefit of creditors. At that time,
Hellman was indebted to Curry to the extent of $9480, for which he had confessed a
judgment as collateral, and had pledged
stocks in certain corporations, with power
in Curry,*as pledgee, to sell on Hellman's
default.
Later than Curry's judgment
was one to John Edgerly for $1,700, then
one to Cbas. Bruner for $2,340. On Oct.
17, 1891, Curry as pledgee sold the stocks
for $1,700. On Jan. 14, 1892, a sale for
$5555 of the land on which the judgments
were liens was confirmed by the Court of
Common Pleas. The personal estate was
sold for $3,420. The debts not secured by
lien amounted to $3,500. The account of
Curry as assignee was duly filed, and before
the auditor appointed to make distribution
he claimed his debt in full and interest to
the time of distribution. The auditor allowed his claim. Exceptions are taken by
the other creditors to auditor's report.
To begin with, the amount of Curry's
claim is not definitely ascertained, but it
is certain that it was in excess of $9,480, the
additional sum being the interest on $9,480
up to the time of the assignment. This
claim being allowed by the auditor, the
question to be determined in this case is,
was such distribution just and legal as regards the rights of the other creditors. It
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is obvious that Curry had the rightto have
the proceeds of the sale of the realty applied
to the satisfaction of his debt; this follows
from the fact that his judgment was prior
to that of Edgerly and of Bruner. His
right to the proceeds of the pledged stocks
cannot be denied him, for he had an exclusive power to sell the stocks for his benefit, immediately upon default of payment
on the part of Hellman. The right of Curry
to both these funds has not been contested
by the exceptant, and the auditor was undoubtedly correct in allowing Curry's claim
so far as it would be satisfied by these two
funds. But after the application of the
$5555 derived from the sale of the realty,
and the $1,700, the proceeds of the sale of
the stocks, to the extinguishment of Curry's claim, there yet remains a residue of
$2,2295 unsatisfied.
The only remaining assets in the estate
of Hellman which could be applied to this
residue is the money which could be derived from the personalty. The personal
property was in fact sold for $3,420. Had
there been no other creditors of Hellman,
this residue should have been paid out of
this sum, but as a matter of fact there were
other outstanding debts to the extent of
$7540. What then is the effect of these
additional debts upon the distribution of
the personal estate? As a matter of law
judgments have no priority over other unsecured debts, in respect to the personalty
of either assigned or decedent's estates.
This point is practically admitted by both
parties. In Fryhoffer v. Busby, 17 S. &
R.- 122, it was said that a judgment has no
lien on the personal property during the
life of the debtor, as relates to funds arising
from the personal property; there is no
ground for preferring one judgment to
another; all come in pro rata in case of deficiency of assets to satisfy the whole. In
other words the courts have said that unsecured debts as well as those secured by
lien on the realty shall share pro rata in
the fund derived from the personal estate.
But Curry's judgment having been partially satisfied the question naturally arises,
what shall be the basis upon which this
pro rata share in the. personalty is to be
reckoned? In Graeff's Appeal, 79 Pa. 146,
the court below decreed a dividend on the
whole amount of the UNPAID judgment
only. Held to be error; the dividen.

should be oa the whole amount of thejudgment until it should be paid in full, if a
pro ratadividend would reach that. This
point was similarly decided in Grove's Appeal, 71 Pa. 460. From these and numerous decisions it follows that Curry in this
case should receive apro rata share with
his whole claim ($9480) as the basis. But
if this method of distribution is followed,
it is evident that there will be a. residue of
over $300 left unsatisfied after Curry has
exhausted his share in the personalty. The
auditor was therefore in error in allowing
the whole of Curry's claim.
By the court the exceptions taken by the
exceptant are granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

The principles on which the court below has made distribution are correct.
Curry is entitled to a dividend on his debt,
as it existed at the time of the assignment,
notwithstanding that, since the making
of the assignment, he has realized $1,700
of it, from the proceeds of the sale of the
pledged personalty. Boyer's Appeal, 163
Pa. 143; Trickett Assignments, 208.
As the creditors are equitable owners of
an insolvent assigned estate, as a security
for their debts, their relative shares in it
cannot be modified. Hence, interest on
debts will be computed only to the date of
the assignment, not to that of the hearing
before the auditor, when the estate is insolvent. Boyer's Appeal, 163 Pa. 155.
All debts, whether secured or not, share
ratably ii the personal fund. What remains of any of such debts, as are secured
by a lien, will be paid from the proceeds
of the land on which they were liens, in
their .order. The judgments of Curry,
Bruner, and Edgerly must therefore receive dividends pro rata, from the personal fund, and what remains of the Curry
judgment must be first paid out of the real
fund.
The unsecured debts amount to $3,500.00
The debt secured by liens are:
Currey. ..................... $9,480
Edgerly's, ................. 1,700
Bruner's,. ................. 2,340 $13,520.00
Total debts ................... $17,020.00
The personal property is $3,420, from
which nearly 201 thousandths of the debts
can be paid, that is,
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Of the unsecured debts ............ $703.31
Of the Curry judgment, ........... 1,904.86
Of the Bruner judgment ......... 470.19
Of the Edgerly judgment ........ 341.64
Curry has realized $1,700 from the
pledged stocks.
From his judgment .................. $9,480.00
Deduct ..................... $1,904.86
1,700.00
3,604.86
To be paid from the real fund ... $5,875.14
The proceeds of the land are ......
5,555.00
The funds in hand of the auditor
will be paid thus:
To the unsecured creditors .......
$703.31
To the Brunerjudgment ..........
470.19
To the Edgerly judgment .........
341.64
To the Curry judgment from personal fund ......... ....... $1,904.86
From the real fund, ....... 5,555.00
$7,459.86
WILBUR RANDALL vs. MATTHIAS
COE AND ELIZA, HIS WIFE.
Assumpsit.
WILLIAM l. FLANIGAN and WENCEL
"HARTMAN, JR., for the plaintiff.
A covenant of warranty is a personal obligation lainding the warrantor to warrant
and defend the title of the covenantee
against adverse claims. Dobbins v. Brown,
12 Pa. 75; Emerson v. Props. I ass. 464;
Athens v. Nale, 2.5 1l. 198; Townsend v.
Morris, 6 Cowen 126.
The purchasing of the outstanding title
amounts to a constructive eviction. Eversole v. Early, 44 N. W. 897; Petrie v. Folz,
54 N. Y. Sup. 223.
In some states the existence of a paramount title in a third person is sufficient
without eviction to constitute a breach of
covenant. Clapp v. Herdman, 2.5 111. App.
509; Biggusv. Bradley, 1 McCord 500.
A grantee may voluntarily yield the
possession upon demand of the owner of
the paramount title. McGary v. Hastings,
39 Cal. 360; Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass.
349; Clarke v. McAnulty, 3 S. & R. 364;
Knepper v. Kurtz, 58 Pa. 484; Gilman v.
Haven, 11 Cush. 330.
SAM. H. MILLER and HERMAN M.
SYPHERD for the defendants.
Mere existence of a paramount title dees
not constitute a breach of the covenant.
Rawle on Covenants for Title, p. 178. To
sustain an action for a breach of covenant
eviction, either actual or constructive,
must be shown. Clarke v. McAnulty, 3 S.
& R. 364; Knepper v. Kurtz, 58 Pa. 484;
Dobbins v. Brown, 2 Jones 79; Sprague v.

Baker, 17 Mass. 590; Patton v. McFarlane, 3 P. & W. 419; Stewart v. West, 14
Pa. 336. Ther6 must be a change of possession. Clarke v. McAnulty, 3 S. & R.
364; Dobbins v. Brown, 12 Pa. 79; Boreel
v. Lawton, 90 N. Y. 293; Dewitt v. Pierson, 112 Mass. 8.
OPINION 0F THE COURT.

RALPH H. LIGHT, P. J.
The material facts in evidence iii this
action are that Matthias Coe and his wife
(now deceased) conveyed a tract of land
by a deed containing the usual covenant
of general warranty. The land had formerly been conveyed to Eliza Coe by Lawrence Saxon. Her grantee's interest *as
sold on ajudgment at Sheriff's sale, Wilbur Randall becoming the purchaser.
Shortly afterwards he discovered that
Saxon had no valid title at the time of
his conveyance to Eliza Coe, but that it
was in Adam Craig. He sought out Craig,
obtained a deed for the land from him,
and paid him $1,500. He now sues Matthias Coe on the covenant of warranty
to recover damages suffered by him.
The covenant of general warranty is a
technical contract the meaning of which
is well established (see Patton v. McFallane, 3 P. & W. 422), and no real or fancied
equity in any particular case can justify a
departure from the well settled rules by
which the rights and liabilites of the parties to such a contract are to be measured.
McGrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa. 122.
Themodern covenant of warranty differg
from the ancient warranty, not because
the latter bound the feoffer to defend the
land, but because it bound him to render
a recompense in lien of damages.
The covenant of warranty protects only
against an ouster from possession, and
therd can therefore be no breach of it assigned without alleging an actual eviction.
Clarke v. McAnulty, 3 S. & 1. "l71. An
eviction must not only be alleged, but
proved, in order to maintain an action upon
a covenant of warranty. This is considered
a well settled proposition. Patton v. McFarlane, 3 P. & W. 423; Knepper v. Kurtz,
58 Pa. 482. The covenant is not broken by
a failure of title, but only by an eviction of
the covenantee from the posses*ion of the
whole, or some part of the premises by title
paramount. McGrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa.
122.

THE FORUM.
A covenant of warranty binds the should have been hostilely asserted. Rawle
grantor to defend the possession against on Covenants, page 202, See. 150; Hauck
every claimant of it by right, and is con- v. Single, 10 Phila. 552.
sequently a covenant against rightful
In the case at bar we find that the plaineviction. To maintain an action for a tiff was not only in undisturbed possession
breach of it, an eviction must be laid of the premises conveyed to him and sufand proved, not necessarily by judicial fered no actual eviction, but according to
process, on the application of physical the facts as established, he voluntarily and
force, but by the legal force of an irresist- at his own exertion sought out Adam Craig
ible title. Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Pa. 231; and purchased from him the superior
Dobbins v. Brown, 12 Pa. 79; Paul v. title. Where is there an equity which the
Whitman, 3 W. & S. 407; 4 Kent, 471,
defendant should satisfy? To allow the
note; Hauck v. Single, 10 Phila. 552.
recovery of the amount thus paid for the
The eviction may be either actual or outstanding title would place the coveconstructive. Scott v. Scott, 20 Pa. 248; nantor at a great disadvantage in point of
Hauck v. Single, 10 Phila. 552.
evidence, and otherwise, in defending
The eviction is actual when the cove- against the covenantee instead of the orignantee is dispossessed of the land, or when inal claimant. We have no evidence
a judgment at law is rendered, which may that the title of Craig was in fact superior
result in actual dispossession; and it is to that of Eliza Coe. Why should she not
constructive where the covenantee, by have had an opportunity to defend?
reason of the paramount title, has never Moreover, Craig has never as far as the
been able to obtain the possession; or evidence shows hostilely asserted his title
where, after the adverse title has been es- since 1889. Might he not have continued
tablished, the covenantee has either pur- to remain quiet?
chased or taken a lease under title, withIn Patton v. McFarlane, supra; a
out any actual change of possession; or grantee under a deed of general warranty
where he has purchased or taken a lease, voluntarily paid the purchase money still
his adverse title not having been estab- due to the Commonwealth by his grantor.
lished.
His possession was not disturbed. In an
The covenant of warranty is held to run action on the warranty, the covenantec
with the land for the protection of the was not allowed to recover the amount
owner in whose time the breach occurs, paid, as there had been no eviction.
and passes with the estate to the purchaser
In Paul v. Whitman, 3 W. & S. 407, a
by involuntary alienation at a Sheriff's judgment in ejectment by itself was held
sale. Rawle on Covenants for Title, page insufficient to work an eviction.
318, Sec. 213.
A grantee in a deed of general warranty
The only question, therefore, necessary who voluntarily surrendered possession of
to be solved is this: Does the mere exist- the whole of a tract of land included in
ence of an outstanding superior title, his warranty, when he could have rewhich the covenantee voluntarily pur- mained in undisturbed possession of onechases, without any demand or assertion
half, cannot recover damages as for an
of title by its owner, amount to a breach eviction from the whole tract. McGrew
of the Covenant of warranty or construc- v. Harmon, 164 Pa. 124.
tive eviction? Eviction implies that it
In Loomis v. Bedel, 11 New Hamp. 74,
shall be involuntary. McGrew v. Harmon, approved in Brown v. Dickerson, 12 Pa.
164 Pa. 122. There must be proof at least 372, and Hauck v. Single, 10 Phila. 553,
of an involuntary loss of the possession, Judge Parker said: 'It seems to be genWilson v. Cochran. 46 Pa. 231; Dobbins v. erally settled that in order to support an
Brown, 12 Pa. 79; Patton v. McFarlane, 3 action upon a covenant of warranty there
P. & W. 425; McGrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa. must be somethiing more than evidence of
122; Clarke v. McAnulty, 3 S. & R. 364; an outstanding paramount title."
Knepper v. Kurtz, 58 Pa. 484. However
We find no other evidence. Wilbur
far the doctrine of constructive eviction Randall was in no manner disturbed or
has been carried, it is believed to be still threatened by the title of Adam Craig.
absolutely necessary that the adverse claim
His purchase was voluntary and he can-

THE FORIUM
not recover. As the plaintiff has failed
to establish his right, it is unnecessary to
consider what liability can be attached to
Matthias Coe's joining in the general
warranty in his wife's deed, inasmuch as
his purpose was merely to make the transfer valid and to divest himself of his
courtesy.
Judgment for the defendant.
IN

THE SUPREME COURT.

The action is by the purchaser of the
grantee's title, against the grantor of the
grantee. He can maintain the action,
since the covenant rune with the land.
McGrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa. 109; McClure v. Gamble, 27 Pa. 288; Terry v.
Drabenstadt, 68 Pa. 400; Brown v. Dickerson, 12 Pa. 372.
The plaintiff has acquired the covenantee's title, by means of a sheriff's sale.
The covenant goes, as an incident, with
the land, although nothing is said about
it in the conveyance. The security furnished by it doubtless enhances to some
extent, the price paid by the purchaser.
There is no reason for holding that the
transmission of this covenant depends on
the voluntariness of the conveyance. We
think the purchaser at a sheriffs sale may
maintain an action on the covenant between the defendant in the execution and
his grantor. White v. Whitney, 3 Mete.

81; Carter v. Exec. of Denman, 3 Zabr.
260, 271; Town v. Needham, 3 Paige, 546;
Rawle, Covenants of Title, 318.
But, has there been a breach of the
covenant of warranty? Such a covenant
stipulates, not that the title obtained by
the covenantee is good, but that he shall
not be disturbed in the possession of the
premises, on account of its imperfection,
that in short, he shall not suffer an eviction by one who has the better title. Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Pa. 231; Patton v. McFarlane, 3 P. & W. 425; McGrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa. 115. There must be more
than a legal possibility of disturbance.
There must be the display by the owner of
the better right of a purpose immediately
to disturb the possession, or there must be
an actual eviction by him. If he is about
to compel a vacation of the premises, the
covenantee may retire, and, on proof that
his resistance would have been fruitless,
he may recover on the covenant. Mcgrew v. Harmon, 164 Pa. 115. Randall
was not threatened with an eviction. He
sought out Craig, and bought Craig's
right. He was therefore neither actually
nor constructively evicted.
Patton v.
M Farlane, 3 P. & W. 425. The conclusion reached by the learned court below is
correct, and the judgment is affirmed.

FREDERIC C. WOODWARD, LL. M.,
Professor of Law of Agency and Negotiable Instruments.

